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Background: Financial abuse of elders is an under acknowledged problem and professionals’ judgements
contribute to both the prevalence of abuse and the ability to prevent and intervene. In the absence of a definitive
“gold standard” for the judgement, it is desirable to try and bring novice professionals’ judgemental risk thresholds
to the level of competent professionals as quickly and effectively as possible. This study aimed to test if a training
intervention was able to bring novices’ risk thresholds for financial abuse in line with expert opinion.
Methods: A signal detection analysis, within a randomised controlled trial of an educational intervention, was
undertaken to examine the effect on the ability of novices to efficiently detect financial abuse. Novices (n = 154)
and experts (n = 33) judged “certainty of risk” across 43 scenarios; whether a scenario constituted a case of financial
abuse or not was a function of expert opinion.
Novices (n = 154) were randomised to receive either an on-line educational intervention to improve financial abuse
detection (n = 78) or a control group (no on-line educational intervention, n = 76). Both groups examined 28 scenarios
of abuse (11 “signal” scenarios of risk and 17 “noise” scenarios of no risk). After the intervention group had received the
on-line training, both groups then examined 15 further scenarios (5 “signal” and 10 “noise” scenarios).
Results: Experts were more certain than the novices, pre (Mean 70.61 vs. 58.04) and post intervention (Mean 70.84 vs.
63.04); and more consistent. The intervention group (mean 64.64) were more certain of abuse post-intervention than
the control group (mean 61.41, p = 0.02). Signal detection analysis of sensitivity (A´) and bias (C) revealed that this was
due to the intervention shifting the novices’ tendency towards saying “at risk” (C post intervention -.34) and away
from their pre intervention levels of bias (C-.12). Receiver operating curves revealed more efficient judgments in
the intervention group.
Conclusion: An educational intervention can improve judgements of financial abuse amongst novice
professionals.
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Financial abuse is defined as ‘theft, fraud, exploitation,
pressure in connection with wills, property or inherit-
ance or financial transactions, or the misuse or mis-
appropriation of property, possessions or benefits’ [1].
It is one of the most prevalent forms of abuse of older
people [2,3]. It is also one of the most challenging areas
of professional judgement and decision making in
social care [4].
Because financial abuse is hard to detect, current
prevalence rates of between 0.7% and 14.4% probably
represent an underestimate [5]. It has been shown that
victims of mass fraudulent “scams” alone cost victims
£3.5 billion a year in the UK [6]. However, not all scams
are reported. In Queensland, Australia, $14 million was
exploited from elders in 2007/8; however as only 14% of
reported cases included the financial amount that the
older person had lost, $97 million represents a more
realistic figure for Queensland, Australia [7].
Older people tend not to report financial abuse; in
some instances they may not be aware that they are
being abused. Even when aware, they may choose not to
report the abuse, especially if they have been abused by
a family member or have been duped in a scam [8]. In
addition, older people with cognitive deficits, although
often targeted by abusers [9], tend to be excluded from
prevalence surveys due to the complexity of organising
consent to participate [2].
Protecting the financial assets of the victim, reducing
the risks of subsequent physical harm and associated
loss of independence [10], requires early intervention.
Mandatory reporting has been introduced in some parts
of the United States to try to ensure suspected abuse is
investigated [11]. Raising suspicions of abuse is not with-
out risk however. A professional may not wish to report
suspected abuse and risk the chance that they may be
mistaken. A mistaken claim can lead to reprimands from
employers and rejection by clients. Indeed nurses have
reported reluctance to report abuse, for fear of recrimin-
ation [12]. In situations where the suspected abuser is
also the carer, professionals may feel cautious about
reporting their suspicions: instigating safeguarding pro-
cedures may jeopardise the support systems surrounding
the person being abused and possibly cause more harm
than good, especially if suspicions turn out to be un-
founded. Professional judgement in this area involves
balancing the need to risk false alarms with the risk of
allowing abuse to continue unchecked. It is complex
and an exemplar of the kind of “irreducible uncer-
tainty” in social policy identified by Hammond [13].
As well as these “internal” qualities in decision makers,
other contextual factors also impact on the effectiveness
of strategies for reducing abuse. Although a multi-
agency approach is advocated [1] professionals are oftenconcerned about sharing information across and within
due to data protection issues and lack of familiarity with
communications systems in other sectors. In one study
of adult safeguarding co-ordinators’ experiences [14],
financial professionals were unwilling to become involved
in addressing suspected financial abuse, or to share
information with safeguarding teams - presenting a
barrier to effective safeguarding.
Underestimated prevalence means that professionals
tend not to consider financial abuse routinely [15]. They
have difficulty recognising abuse and even when it is
identified they do not always report it [16]. They are not
fully aware of the risk factors or warning signs of abuse
and without training it has been shown that they strug-
gle to identify this underappreciated but prevalent prob-
lem [17]. Very thorough and useful research has been
undertaken to examine the factors that might influence
professional recognition and reporting of elder abuse
as a whole [18], but more specific research is needed to
examine those factors linked to the most prevalent
form of elder abuse: elder financial abuse. Educational
programmes can be an effective means of increasing
awareness, collaboration and improved detection making
capacity in this domain [19].
Professionals working in more senior posts have been
shown to be more able to recognise signs of elder abuse
than junior colleagues. For example, Kitchen et al. [12]
demonstrated that senior nurses were able to take more
appropriate action in cases of elder physical abuse than
junior nurses. Scores were measured by comparing
nurses’ self-reported actions in response to case vignettes
against a model answer reflecting the “correct” policy.
Senior nurses had a more appropriate threshold for
triggering interventions, whilst junior nurses’ threshold
for taking action was too low. However, these results
only held where the vignette reported definite abuse.
Where cases were less clear-cut (i.e. more uncertain), no
differences were found in action capacity between junior
and senior nurses. The authors suggested that this may
be because nurses are ill equipped to deal with such
sensitive and complex decisions and do not know the
appropriate procedures for reporting. They highlighted
the need for comprehensive training to be developed to
assist junior clinicians to develop more appropriate
thresholds for abuse detection and prevention.
At the heart of decisions to prevent and counter elder
abuse are the judgements of health and social care
professionals. There is evidence that various types of
information impact on the judgements made by these
professional groups. For example, Davies et al. [20] used
social judgement analysis to reveal that the nature of the
financial problem and the clients’ cognitive capacity both
significantly influenced professionals’ certainty of abuse
and the likelihood of taking action. Professionals were
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kinds of financial problems, such as family members
misusing Power of Attorney, or where older people were
thought to be the target of rogue traders. Significant risk
was also identified in cases where older people had limited
mental capacity; the more limited their capacity the higher
the perceived risk of abuse. The findings were used to
develop an on-line educational intervention to improve
novices’ ability to identify elder financial abuse. A trial was
undertaken to test the effectiveness of the intervention
with the mean expert risk score of each case being used as
a reference standard against which novices’ performance
was measured. The intervention was found to be effective
in enhancing the novices’ capacity to detect and take
action in cases of elder financial abuse [21].
Davis et al. [20] did not look at the thresholds or “tipping
points” above which novices’ classified evidence as indica-
tive of abuse. These relationships matter, as professionals
lacking experience are not usually well “calibrated”; they
need to be more sensitive to recognising abuse [22]. Recog-
nising the uncertainty in a judgement or decision is a key
driver for information acquisition [23] and empirically
the evidence surrounding professionals’ confidence and
their related judgement performance [24-27] suggests
room for improvement. In Davies’ study, certainty of abuse
was shown to be strongly correlated with the decision to
take action to prevent abuse [20]. Interventions that can
heighten sensitivity to recognition of abuse, through a
lowering of risk threshold could be expected to lead to a
more appropriate, heightened action response.
Research has yet to examine whether those less expe-
rienced have a different threshold level from more
experienced professionals and if so whether they can be
trained to alter their threshold to obtain a closer match
to those with more experience. If they can shift their
threshold to identify more cases, ideally while not in-
creasing the number of false positives cases, their abil-
ity to recognise elder financial abuse will have become
more effective.
Successfully intervening in cases of elder financial
abuse then requires the ability to, appropriately, manage
the identification of risk in uncertain situations and to
separate out and pay attention to the truly relevant in a
situation whilst discounting the irrelevant. At the same
time the professional needs to deploy these skills in ways
that minimise incorrect allegations and maximise the prob-
ability of alleging abuse when it is – in truth – present.
In this paper we address the following research questions:
1. Do novice and expert thresholds for detection differ
from each other when examining case scenarios of
elder financial abuse?
2. Does training bring novice detection of financial
abuse risk in line with expert opinion?3. Does training improve novices’ ability to identify
more cases of abuse (hits) without increasing the
number of false positives?Methods
The RCT (“Educating novice practitioners to detect
financial abuse”; ESRC grant number RES-189-25-0334),
from which the present analysis is drawn, aimed to test
the effectiveness of a decision-training intervention on
the capacity to detect and prevent elder financial abuse.
A parallel-group, randomised controlled trial was con-
ducted using a judgement analysis approach [21]. The
intervention group was provided with training after
baseline testing, whereas the control group were purely
given instructions to continue with the task. The inter-
vention comprised of written and graphical descriptions
of an expert consensus standard explaining how case
information should be used to detect and prevent elder
financial abuse. Participants’ ratings of certainty of abuse
(detection) and selected actions (prevention) were corre-
lated with the experts’ ratings of the same cases at each
stage of testing, as well as examining effect on mean
group scores and cue use. The results of this study indi-
cated that the decision-training aid has a positive effect
on decision capacity. Further details of the RCT are
given in the following sections as needed.Signal Detection – A theoretical framework for exploring
judgements of elder financial abuse
Signal detection theory (SDT) approaches offers a theor-
etical framework for exploring decision thresholds and
the ability to separate risk (signals) from the noise in
situations of possible abuse. SDT has been applied to
many areas of judgement and decision making [28] since
its initial application to communication and psychology
[29]. Examples include distinguishing between truth and
lies and medical diagnosis and radiological interpretation
[30] and decision making in cases of child abuse [31].The
methodology has also been applied to examine the assess-
ment of risk (of patients’ critical events) by nurses [32] and
to explore the impact of enhanced “realism” in clinical
simulation on the ability to detect risk signals [33].
In this paper we expand on an earlier social judgement
analysis [21]. Combining SDT and social judgement ana-
lysis has proved useful previously: Cheyne et al. [34]
compared the decision to transfer of women from rural
led maternity care to acute services by midwifes and ob-
stetricians. Social judgement analysis illustrated variables
influencing the decision to transfer and the importance
attached to them. Signal detection analysis explored the
performance of judgement polices for identifying high
and low risks cases, and compared the thresholds for
action between professionals. Whilst professionals used
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to transfer a woman varied significantly.
To the best of our knowledge, SDT approaches have
not been used before to explore suspected elder financial
abuse. We are interested in examining how thresholds
compare between novices and experienced professionals;
as elder financial abuse is generally under reported it is
proposed that experienced professionals would have a
lower threshold for detection of abuse than novices;
experts would therefore identify more cases of abuse
from the case set presented than novices. Crucially –
because they have had the opportunity to “learn” from
experience – it is reasonable to assume that this ability
to identify more cases of abuse would not be at the
expense of incorrectly alleging abuse. Because it is often
presumed that training can be used to bring novices’
performance closer that that of experienced practi-
tioners, we are also interested in whether novices can be
“trained” to bring their threshold down to a level that
allows them to identify cases of abuse whilst not increas-
ing the number of incorrect allegations. This effect
would need to tested against a control; the control group
would also be asked to judge the same scenarios but
without the opportunity for training. If novices can be
helped to identify more cases of actual abuse (actual
cases being those which experienced professionals iden-
tify), then their skills will have been enhanced. We will
focus on clinicians’ decision making (health and social
care professionals) because they are well placed to detect
elder financial abuse [17].
To illustrate the role of SDT for unpacking judge-
ments of financial abuse of elders, consider a health or
social care professional judging the likelihood of finan-
cial abuse of an older adult with whom they are working
(“yes” they are at risk or “no” they are not at risk). Each
older adult has a true, but unknown and uncertain, risk
of abuse. Thus there are four possible outcomes associ-
ated with the judgement (Table 1):
As Table 1 illustrates, judgments in which a profes-
sional correctly indicates that an elderly person is at risk
(when in truth they are indeed at risk) can be termed
‘hits’. Incorrectly indicating a patient is at risk (when in
truth they are not) represents a ‘false alarm’. Thus, for
this yes/no (risk/not at risk) judgement the hit rate
(probability of correctly classifying an elder as at risk)Table 1 The four possible outcomes from a “yes/no” signal de
Judged level of financial abuse True level of financ
At Risk
At Risk True positive/HIT
Correct outcome
Not At Risk False negative/MISS
Incorrect outcomeand the false alarm rate (the probability of incorrectly
classifying an elder as at risk) describe judgement per-
formance [28]. Where a professional makes judgements
on elders who in truth (a state which is unknown to the
professional) are “at risk” these are termed “signal” cases.
Conversely, judgements on elderly people who are not
“at risk” (again, a state that is unknown to the profes-
sional) represent “noise” or “no signal” scenarios. When
making judgements, individuals draw on internalised
rules [28]. These rules are unique to each person but
common examples include the intuitive feeling that,
“something is not right” [35], or perhaps a systematic
unwillingness to make a judgement call of heightened
risk of financial abuse for fear of, “getting it wrong” or
setting off punitive investigative process. Often, these
applied rules can efficiently separate signal scenarios
from noise scenarios [36,37]. Over many judgments, the
information present in signal and noise scenarios will
differ and professionals should amend their judgement
rules accordingly. Thus, for multiple signal cases there
will be a distribution of hit and false alarm rates, with an
equivalent distribution for noise cases. Reducing the
overlap between the signal and the noise distribution
would increase the hit rate whilst decreasing the false-
alarm rate. Figure 1 illustrates the idea of signal and
noise distributions arising from multiple cases of the
same judgment.
Figure 1 illustrates two important concepts that have
been operationalised from the hit and false alarm rates
(see data analysis section for means of classification of
hits and false alarms). Firstly, each professional will have
a tendency towards classifying people as “at risk” or “not
at risk”; this is referred to as beta, or β. When profes-
sionals favour neither the ‘yes’ response nor the “no”
response, beta equals one. A value of β less than one in-
dicates a bias toward responding ‘yes’, whilst a value of β
greater than one indicates a bias toward responding
“no”. Furthermore, each professional’s signal and noise
distributions will overlap; the greater the overlap (or the
smaller the distance between the peaks of their distribu-
tions) the lower the ability of the professional to separate
signals (risk) from noise (no risk); a distance between
the peaks of signal and noise distributions referred to as
d´ prime or d´. This d´evaluates the distance between
the means of signal and noise scenarios in standardtection task
ial abuse risk
Not At Risk
False positive/FALSE ALARM
Incorrect outcome
True negative/CORRECT REJECTION Correct outcome
Figure 1 Distribution of the decision variable across noise and
signal scenarios, showing d´, c, and the likelihoods on which β
is based.
Table 2 Experts’ mean certainty of abuse, standard
deviation and 95% confidence intervals
Mean* N (scenarios) SD 95% confidence interval
70.61 28 8.63 67.97 – 73.4
*range 0–100, higher score indicates more certainty of risk of abuse.
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ity of the professional to distinguish signals from noise,
whilst a larger value signifies his/her greater ability to
distinguish signals from noise [28].
For some judgements the distributions of d´ and β are
not normally distributed. Accordingly, two non-parametric
measures of d´ and β exist: A´ (A prime) and C [28]. A´
ranges from .5, representing a person who cannot distin-
guish signals (“risk of abuse”) from noise (“no abuse”), to 1,
representing “perfect” performance. C is the distance
between the decision criterion and the (neutral) point
at which neither a signal or noise response is favoured
(i.e. where β = 1) for C this is equal to 0 [28]. The
degree of deviation from this neutral point is measured
in standard deviation units and so positive units indi-
cate a tendency to say no (not at risk) and negative
values indicate a tendency to say yes (at risk).
“Signal” scenarios
In order to identify cases representative of financial
abuse, we used experienced health and social care pro-
fessionals’ decisions (n = 33) on a set of 43 scenarios
used in a previous study [38]. The professionals (n = 33)
ranged from 23 to 61 years old, with a mean age of 46
years. The sample included 26 females (79%), and 7 males
(21%). Twenty-six participants (79%) recorded their ethni-
city as ‘White – Welsh/English/Scottish/Northern Irish/
British’. They had been in their current job for between 1
year and 20 years, with a mean of 7 years. They had been
in the profession for between 2 and 35 years, with a mean
of 16 years. The expert status of the professionals group
could be questioned as some had limited experience, short
time current experience in post, etc. It is also quite pos-
sible that some of the more experienced professionals had
not become experts; experience is no guarantee of expert-
ise [38]. The means by which expert status can be assured
is difficult where no gold standard criterion exists; lengthof experience, level of education and work position held
are no guarantee of expert ability [39]. However these
33 “experts” had been selected from a larger sample of
152 social care and health professionals who took part
in a piece of research conducted by Davies et al. [38] to
determine judgement policies used by professionals in
cases of suspected of elder financial abuse. The means
by which the 33 experts had been selected was based on
an empirical measurement of their expertise ability.
This was a bootstrap approach in which the individual’s
own decisions were used to validate or invalidate their
status as experts. This approach, known as the CWS
approach, uses inconsistency and discrimination to
determine expertise capacity and has been shown as a
valid expert index across a range of domains [39]. The
33 expert professionals were therefore selected on the
basis of being those with the highest CWS indices, i.e.
they had a low level of judgement inconsistency and a
high ability to modify judgements in line with changing
information; essential characteristics of expert decision
makers [39] (see Davies, 2011 for further details). The
expert status is therefore assured as far as is feasible for
a domain where no external criterion exists, against
which to measure expert ability.
Each expert recorded their “certainty of abuse” for
each scenario a visual analogue scale ranging from
‘Certain abuse is not occurring’, to ‘Certain abuse is
occurring’ (0–100). These anchors were developed with
experts in the field from health, social care and charit-
able sectors; groups who were dealing with these issues
on a regular basis. The labels could have anchored in
other ways for example the concepts of “very low risk”
and “very high risk” could have been used; this would
present the judgement range as being a spectrum be-
tween the two extremes; future researchers may like to
consider this. In our study, a certainty of abuse score for
each trial was recorded for each of the 33 experts for
each of the scenarios. The mean certainty of abuse and
95% confidence intervals for the expert sample were
calculated (see Table 2). Those scenarios where the
experts’ average certainty was greater than the 95% upper
confidence limit (73.4) were deemed “signal” trials: i.e. if
we undertook the study repeatedly, with different experts,
97.5% of the time they would assign an overall mean
level of certainty lower than 73.4.
The number of scenarios to be used with the novices
as the ‘before’ and ‘after’ training scenarios were calcu-
lated using the ratio calculations detailed in the
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Once these two sets of scenarios had been identified, the
signal/no signal scenarios were calculated. Those scenar-
ios in which the mean was less than or equal to the 95%
upper confidence interval bound constituted “no signal”
scenarios. Thus, a signal trial was one in which the ex-
perts collectively viewed the risk of abuse as significantly
higher than average.
Applying this rule yielded 11 signal and 17 no signal
scenarios in the cases the novices would judge as pre
intervention scenarios and 5 signal and 10 no signal sce-
narios in the cases which the novices would judge as
post intervention scenarios (see below for trial design).
Capturing novice signal detection
An a priori sample size calculation was undertaken: in
order to identify a medium effect (r = .3) it was calcu-
lated that 48 participants would be needed for both the
intervention and control group when using an α – level
of .05 and .8 power. Novice professionals (students) from
11 pre-registration clinical programmes across eight
universities in the south of England were non-randomly
selected to take part in the trial [20,21]. A randomisation
table was created by MD in Excel. The Excel RAND-
BETWEEN (0,1) function was used to allocate each of
the participants to one of two groups - either interven-
tion or control - and participating students were then
given an individual password. The intervention group
judged 28 scenarios prior to receiving an educational
intervention that was aimed at improving recognition of
financial abuse in elders and 15 scenarios after receiving
the intervention. The control group did not receive any
training at any stage , however they did judge the same
scenarios as the intervention group.
Training intervention
The intervention outlined to participants the way in
which experts chose to weight the relative importance of
the cues and the content of the cues included in the case
scenarios, thus highlighting the pertinent factors to con-
sider in instances of suspected financial abuse. Within
the scenarios, there were seven types of cues. These
comprised the identifier of the abuse (e.g. professional,
family, friend, older person); the financial problem (e.g.
stealing, anomalies in finances, unknown befrienders,
misuses of power of attorney and rogue traders); and the
mental capacity and physical capacity of the individual.
Additionally, age, gender and living circumstances of the
individual were included so as to contextualise each of
the scenarios.
The information that was provided in the training edu-
cated participants on how to utilise the cue information
when making decisions and how to interpret the content
of these cues. Particular emphasis was placed uponidentifying the nature of the financial problem and the
mental capacity of the individual, which were regarded
as the two most significant cues in aiding detection of
financial abuse. Graphical and descriptive information
was developed and tested to establish ease of under-
standing and to ensure comprehensiveness of optimal
knowledge transfer. The test site for the decision train-
ing aid was hosted online. It was not possible to deter-
mine to what extent the intervention group fully
engaged in the use of online training resource as each
participant did this remotely at a time and place of their
choosing. A few mechanisms were included in the
design to reduce the chance of disengagement for
example they did have to scroll down and press on the
continue button at the end of each page of the training
information before proceeding to the next page but this
was no guarantee that they had thoroughly read and
understood the training information. The only way by
which engagement could be assumed would be if there
was a positive impact of the exposure on the novice
decision makers’ judgements.
As the novices made judgements of risk of abuse
(“certainty of abuse”) on the same set of 43 scenarios
that the experienced clinicians had judged, mean level of
certainty and a 95% upper confidence interval limit could
be computed for the control and intervention groups for
both the pre and post intervention sets of scenarios. The
evaluations of the second set of scenarios were undertaken
immediately after the novices had finished viewing the
intervention information. Pilot testing identified that
full task could be completed by novices and experts in
under an hour which was deemed manageable by the
pilot participants.
As with the experienced clinicians, where a novice
judged a trial as more certain (of abuse) than the upper
95% confidence limit, this indicated that, in their judge-
ment, the elderly person was significantly more at risk of
financial abuse. Thus, the decision variable was the sense
of certainty that the expert/novice felt when confronted
with information that may indicate financial abuse and
the criterion (the value that defines sufficiently high
certainty to warrant a judgement call that this might be
abuse) was point beyond which action is warranted.
Ethical approval
Brunel University London’s School of Health Sciences and
Social Care Research Ethics committee granted ethical
approval for the research.
Data analysis
Data were analysed as a yes/no signal detection task [28].
Hits and false alarms were calculated for each novice for
each trial in the pre and post intervention trial sets. For
the signal scenarios a novice level of certainty significantly
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ios a novice level of certainty significantly higher than
average constituted a false alarm.
Hit (H) and false alarm (F) rates were calculated for each
novice. H was found by dividing the hits for each novice
by the number of signal scenarios. F was calculated by
dividing the number of false alarms by the total number of
noise scenarios. Z scores for H and F and signal detection
measures were computed using the formulae and SPSS
syntax outlined by Stanislaw and Todorov [28].
After calculating mean scores for certainty, C and A´
for both intervention and control groups at baseline and
immediately after the training intervention, assumptions
of normality were tested (using the Shapiro-Wilk test in
SPSS ver 21.0). Distributions were non-normal in one or
other of the groups for certainty, H, F, d´, β. Thus A´and
C and the non-parametric test (Mann–Whitney U test)
were used to test the significance level of the difference
between groups. All analysis was undertaken in SPSS
version 21.Figure 2 Consort Flow Chart [42].ROC curves for the intervention and control groups
were calculated using the procedures outlined in Zhang
and Mueller [40], these procedures thereby correcting
for differences in distributions, false alarm and hit rates.
Zhang and Mueller’s [41] procedures use two slightly
different (non parametric) measures of sensitivity and
bias to the more commonly reported measures of A´and
C [28]. Their measure of sensitivity is “A” and bias (“b”);
interpretation is identical to A´and C and readers are
directed to Zhang and Mueller [41] for the necessary
computational procedures.
Results
154 novices made judgements of risk of abuse (“certainty
of abuse”) on the same set of 43 scenarios that the expe-
rienced clinicians had judged. Seventy-eight novices
were randomised into the intervention group and 76
into the control group (see Figure 2) [42].
Of the novices, just over half - 53% (n = 81) - were med-
ical students, 19% (n = 29) studied occupational therapy,
Table 3 Mean certainty (of abuse) and upper 95% CI limit for pre and post intervention scenarios, and expert scores
for the comparable scenarios
Phase Students Experts
(n = 154) (n = 33)
Pre intervention Mean 58.04 70.61
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Upper Bound 58.75 73.96
Post intervention Mean 63.04 70.84
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Upper Bound 64.00 76.08
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As the novices were students on two, three or four year
programmes, demographic data to their stage of training
was gathered by using the generic terms of early, mid and
final stage of training: 31% (n = 47) of the participants
were in their early stage, 47% (n = 72) in the mid-stage
of their training and 23% (n = 35) in their final stage.
Age, gender and ethnicity were also noted, with 75% of
novices (n = 115) < 25 years old, 25% (n = 39) > 25 years
old; 71% (n = 109) being female, 29% (n = 45) male; and
66% (n = 101) reporting their ethnicity to be White, 8%
(n = 12) Chinese, 6% (n = 9) Asian, 5% (n = 7) African
and 16% (n = 25) of unknown ethic background.
Did novices’ and experts’ thresholds for detection differ
from each other when examining scenarios of elder
financial abuse?
The experts’ mean certainty (of abuse) was higher than
the novices’ mean across the first (pre intervention) 28
scenarios, indicating that they had a lower threshold for
abuse identification than the novices. Here the novices
in the intervention and control groups have their data
amalgamated. The experts also were found to have a
consistent threshold across the scenario sets i.e. their
threshold remained at the same level on both scenario
sets. See Table 3.
Does training align novices’ bring detection abilities
closer to that of experienced professionals?
Prior to the intervention, the control (n = 76, mean
59.15) and intervention group (n = 78, mean 56.97) did
not differ significantly in the certainty assigned to their
responses (Mann Whitney U = 2708, z = −.92, p > 0.05).
After the training the intervention group (n = 78) were
significantly more certain of the risk of abuse (meanTable 4 Certainty pre and post intervention
Pre intervention certainty
n Mean Standard
Control 76 59.15 10.08
Intervention 78 56.97 10.5264.64) than the control group (n = 76, mean 61.41),
Mann Whitney U = 3598, z = 2.29, p = 0.02. See Table 4.
Did training bring novice detection of financial abuse risk
in line with expert opinion?
Table 5 shows that the intervention group had a higher
hit rate after the training (from an average 67% to 85%)
but their false alarm rate also increased slightly (from
41% to 44%). Whilst the control group’s hit rate did not
change between the judgements made on the first and
second set of scenarios, they did make fewer false alarm
judgements (See Table 6).
The 78 novices receiving the intervention (mean A´,
.71) were not significantly more sensitive (probability of
saying “at risk” when the trial indicates “risk”) than the
control group (n = 76, mean A´, .70) prior to training
(Mann Whitney U = 3051, z = .32, p > 0.05). They were,
however, more likely to have a tendency toward classifying
scenarios as “at risk of abuse” (Mann Whitney U = 2062,
z = −3.26, p = 0.001).
The relationship between sensitivity and bias, and the
impact on hit and false alarm rates can be presented
graphically using ROC curves for the intervention and
control groups (See Figures 3 & 4). Note that Zhang and
Mueller’s [41] ROC procedures produce a range of pos-
sible curves through a single point on the curve (in this
case the point nearest to the top left of the graph). We can
see that the effect of a more appropriate bias (decision
tendency) in the intervention group results in better per-
formance overall - even if their judgement sensitivity is no
better than the control group.
Discussion
Before novices had received any training, experts had a
lower threshold for detection of abuse than the novices,Post intervention certainty
deviation (SD) Mean SD
61.41 11.54
64.64 10.05
Table 5 Hit and false alarm rates post intervention
Pre intervention hit rate Post intervention hit rate Pre intervention false alarm rate Post intervention false alarm rate
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Control .69 .24 .69 .32 .44 .20 .33 .26
Intervention .67 .27 .85 .22 .41 .20 .44 .25
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abuse. This is heartening; in an area where under report-
ing is rife, it is important that the more experienced pro-
fessionals are more able to detect abuse than novice
professionals. They can lead good practice and model
effective behaviour for novices. It is also a positive that
the experienced professionals remained fairly consistent
in their 95% confidence interval for the mean ratings
across both sets of scenarios, thereby indicating a rela-
tively stable threshold. Of course there may have been
some small variation in the level of abuse presented in
the two scenario sets that could have accounted for any
small degrees of variation; however the scenario sets
were generated to contain relatively similar types of
scenarios. Although consistency does not de facto ensure
“expert” practice as experts can be consistently wrong,
inconsistency is indicative of a lack of skill as it suggests
that the decision maker has yet to develop a well-developed
judgement policy [39]. The experts were clearly not novices
in this study. In Cheyne’s [34] study, which examined
midwives’ patient transfer decisions, some variation in
individual decision thresholds was also found, although
they did not aim to only focus on expert practice and no
comparison of novice and experts’ thresholds were
undertaken. The Kitchen et al. [12] findings did exam-
ine novice-expert differences in terms of identification
of elder abuse and showed that novices were less able to
detect abuse as compared with experts but only in
clear-cut scenarios of abuse; no difference in the detec-
tion ability between novices and experts was found
when judging more complex cases.
Before training, the novices were less certain whether
abuse was occurring than the experts, indicating a
higher threshold for classifying risk of financial abuse
than the experienced professionals. After training the
novices were, on average, more certain that abuse was
occurring, indicating a lowering of their threshold; the
training had altered the novices’ threshold with theirTable 6 Sensitivity (A´) and bias (C) post intervention
A´ pre intervention A´ post intervention
Mean SD
Control (n = 76) .70 .13
Intervention (n = 78) .71 .11threshold moving closer to that of the experts. This shift
in their threshold enabled them to correctly identify
more cases of abuse, which demonstrates enhanced skill
in this context; the need being to identify under-reported
cases [43].
Although the training brought the novices’ decisions
more in line with those of the experts, they did not fully
achieve the experts’ threshold capacity. Better signal de-
tection ability arose from training improving novices’
ability to accurately identify cases of financial abuse by
shifting their decision tendency: increasing their willing-
ness to (appropriately) say “at risk” in the simulated
cases, but also increasing false alarm rates. If translated
to real practice, those who had been trained would be
able to detect more cases of financial abuse than those
who had not received the training, but would also risk
making more unfounded accusations. This kind of trade-
off is perhaps preferable to leaving more actual cases of
abuse undetected.
The study is limited in that accuracy of risk assess-
ment was measured by comparing novices’ decisions
with those of nominal experts, which may indicate the
potential for systematic bias. It is important to note that
actual cases, with known outcomes, would provide
more valid data with which to compare the accuracy of
decisions. Another issue related to the degree of experi-
ence the experts had obtained. Although the sub group
were identified in the original study as superior to the
larger sample originally collected [37], financial abuse is
not an everyday issue that professionals come across;
expertise maybe more difficult to develop compared
with some other types of more practised decision mak-
ing with higher levels of feedback [44]. However the fact
that the experts remained consistent in their decision
threshold and that they exhibited the (desirable) rela-
tively low threshold for detection of elder abuse justifies
some confidence in the use of threshold as a reference
standard.C pre intervention C post intervention
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
.75 .14 -.21 .63 .09 .87
.76 .14 -.12 .72 -.34 .63
Figure 3 Intervention group ROC curve.
Harries et al. BMC Medical Education  (2014) 14:1044 Page 10 of 12The training aimed to enhance the novices’ capacity to use
the case information to determine an appropriate response.
However, other issues such as effective multidisciplinary
working were not addressed. Such issues are seen as central
to effective actions arising from abuse detection. The train-
ing also only addressed the decision needs of health and so-
cial care professionals. There may be merit in examining the
signal detection ability, and responsiveness to training, of
professionals involved in safeguarding and detection in areas
such as the financial and legal sectors [45].
Conclusions
Judging financial abuse risk will always be surrounded
by imperfect, incomplete information and “noise”; thisFigure 4 Control group ROC curve.study has shown that training novice professionals can
help. Specifically, it has shown that an educational
intervention can counter a tendency to say “no risk”
by shifting (appropriately) novices’ tendencies towards
making “at risk” judgement calls. Whilst this study may
help improve a single cohort of future professionals’ risk
detection, far more work in this important area is
needed in order to enhance detection expertise and to
protect elders from financial abuse.
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